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Article 5

RECENT CASE NOTES
or profession of faith, to have juggled the term to suit its "best" interests,
the question is not whether this is desirable, but whether or not there is
anything to prevent it within the terms of the Indiana Constitution. It
seems, therefore, that with the exception of the due process interpretation,
the law in question here was not unconstitutional, under the decision as
set out in the principal case, and that to take care of the vacancy created,
Article 15, Sec. 3, should have been applied.
L. H. W.
CONSTITUTIONlAL LAw-TAxATioN-Wisconsin attempted to tax plaintiff's income on the basis of the combined total of his income and that of
his wife. Held, unconstitutional, contrary to due process.
The state law
provided that in computing income tax, the income tax of married persons
shall be computed on the combined average taxable income of husband and
wife.2 Taxes levied shall be payable by such husband, or head of the
family, but if not paid by him may be enforced against any person whose
income is included within the tax computation. The assessor asserted
against the plaintiff, a tax computed on the combined total of his and his
wife's income as shown by separate returns, treating the aggregate as
the income of the husband. The amount so ascertained and assessed exceeded the sum of taxes which would have been due had their taxable
incomes been separately assessed. This resulted from the fact that the
statute in question provides for surtaxes graduated according to the amount
of the taxpayer's net income. The greater the income, the higher the tax
paid. Plaintiff paid the tax under protest, and seeks to recover so much
thereof as was in excess of the tax computed on his own separate income.
He asserted that the statute, as applied to him, violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin overruled this contention,3
and plaintiff appealed. The United States-Supreme Court held that since
the state had taken from the marriage status, except in its purely social
aspects, all the elements which differentiated the status of the married
person from that of the single person, a mere difference in social relations
does not so alter the taxable status of one receiving income as to justify a
different measure for the tax. Therefore, the classification was arbitrary,
discriminatory, and a denial of due process.
By the law of Wisconsin,4 a wife's property is her own-and she may
convey, devise or bequeath same as though she were unmarried. Since in
law and in fact, her income is her separate property, the question is
whether the state has the power by an income tax law to measure the
husband's tax-not by his own income-but, in part, by that of another.
Any attempt by a state to measure the tax on one person's property or
income by reference to the property or income of another is contrary to
due process.5 That which is not income cannot be made such by calling it
income. 6 Although the Wisconsin court sustained the statute in question 7
on the ground that the provisions under attack are necessary to prevent
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fraud and evasions because the marriage relation offers opportunities that
do not exist to the same degree for single persons, for shifts and transfers
of property to secure exemptions from income taxes and to avoid the higher
brackets of such a tax, the United States Supreme Court held that rights
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution are superior to the supposed
necessity of these provisions to prevent fraud and evasions because of the
opportunities for same offered by the marriage relation. The State is
forbidden to deny due process of law or equal protection of the laws for
any purpose whatsoever. The provisions of the tax statute do not reestablish what was formerly an incident of the marriage relation. Since
the property of the wife is still her own, the effort to tax the husband for
the wife's income did not make it his income and so the taxing as a joint
income, that which under the state's law is owned separately, merely to
secure a higher tax than would be the sum of the taxes on the separate
incomes, is an arbitrary and unreasonable classification. A forbidden tax
cannot be enforced to facilitate the collection, of one properly laid.8
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Holmes, in which Justices
Brandies and Stone concurred, was based on the ground that the husband
and wife usually get the benefit of the income of each other, and that
taxation may consider not only the legal command over, but the actual
enjoyment of the property taxed.9 The minority held that it is the
Court's business to supply any formula necessary to carry out the expressed intent of the legislature, and that the legislature here had clearly
indicated that it intended to accomplish a certain result within its power
to do-that of keeping one characteristic of the marriage relation. Since
the minority were of the opinion that the difference between the marriage
status and that of an unmarried person was a reasonable basis for the
classification, the question of denying due process does not arise under
their view.
The minority view is very plausible, for a tax on the basis of joint
incomes would seem not unreasonable in view of the fact that the benefit
of such incomes might enure to the head of the family, and he would then
be enjoying the income taxed, though he has not the legal command over
it.1o However, the state legislature has expressly made the wife's income
her separate property" and, while the legislature undoubtedly has the
power to change the incidents of the marriage relation, as long as it has
given the wife the absolute control over her income, the measurement of
the husband's tax on the basis of the joint income to give the state the
benefit of the increased tax on the larger income is clearly an attempt to
measure the tax on one person's property or income by reference to the
property or income of another, and so is contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 2
L. J. H.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-ESTOPPEL OF TENANT TO DENY LANDLORD'S

TiTLF-On April 15, 1927, the plaintiff leased certain real estate to the
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